expectations of the parties to the commercial contracts in question are defeated by the retroactive operation of the FSIA." 7 The best paradigm to analyze immunity is in the context of bond issues by the governments of foreign nations. In the early twentieth century, when governments issued bonds in order to finance public works, as in the case described above, it was with the implicit understanding that the holders of the notes would have no recourse. At the time, absolute sovereign immunity prevailed around the globe, and unless a nation consented to suits in its own courts, there was no method of enforcement.1 8 The market allotted this risk, as it does all such risks, in the form of the interest rate demanded by purchasers of the bonds and the success of the issue. '9 Allowing claims arising from these types of commercial transactions to proceed in the courts of the United States would permit the holders of the notes and other plaintiffs to have the benefit of their bargain twice.'°I n this Comment I argue that courts should not apply the FSIA retroactively to commercial transactions occurring before 1952. In Part I, I discuss the history of sovereign immunity in international law and its role in U.S. courts, culminating with the passage of the FSIA in 1976. In Part II, I focus on how courts have treated the question of the FSIA's retroactivity, both before and after the Court's decision in Landgraf. In Part III, I argue that, under Landgraf, courts should not apply the FSIA retroactively pre-1952.
I. HISTORY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Foreign sovereign immunity compels domestic courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state." In its absolute form, sovereign immunity extends to the state in all of its avatars, including stateowned commercial operations and entities. Chief Justice Marshall was the first to pronounce this principle as binding in U.S. courts:
17
Throughout this Comment I will focus on the commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity. See 28 USC § 1605(a)(2) and note 6. The majority of the cases arising before 1952 deal with bond issues and other commercial endeavors of foreign sovereigns. The arguments presented here, such as those focusing on the efficient placement of risk, will have less purchase in cases arising out of other exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. See Part III.D. This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor their sovereign rights, as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him. This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation." Note that Marshall's discussion of waiver focuses not on the nation subject to a progpective lawsuit, but on the sovereign that chooses not to exercise jurisdiction over another nation.
Until the twentieth century, this absolute form of sovereign immunity prevailed throughout the world. 24 Although U.S. courts may have been the first" to announce the theory as binding in this country, others soon followed.2 However, by the turn of the century, owing to increased commerce among nations, the theory had begun to evolve to include an exception for the private acts of sovereigns. 7 This exception
22
The Schooner Exchange v McFadden, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116,137 (1812) .
23
"[Elvery sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation." Id. 
25
See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments at 1 (cited in note 18), citing Gamal Badr, State Immunity:An Analytic and Prognostic View 9-70 (Martinus Nijhoff 1984) (concluding that U.S. courts were the first to announce the theory of immunity for "foreign states and their agents"). became a part of what is referred to as the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.8
The adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was slow, but steady. One of the first courts to explicitly invoke this distinction, or restrictive theory, appears to have been the Belgian Cour de Cassation." Italy was also an early adherent to the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity." In the 1920s, even nations that had previously embraced the absolute theory, such as France, were adopting the restrictive theory." Other nations appeared to adopt the restrictive theory as a matter of first impression. 3 2
The restrictive theory had also gained adherents in the United States. Justice Story, well ahead of his time, seemed to suggest some sort of restrictive theory. 33 30 Tate Letter at 984 (cited in note 5) (noting that Belgium and Italy had "always" embraced the restrictive theory).
31 Id (noting that "the courts of France, Austria, and Greece, which were traditionally supporters of the classical [absolute] theory, reversed their position in the 20s to embrace the restrictive theory").
32
Id (noting that Denmark, Romania, and Peru seem to have followed the restrictive theory).
33 See US v Wilder, 28 F Cas 601,604 (Cir Ct D Mass 1838) (noting that "the promises, the conventions, and all the private obligations of the sovereign are naturally subject to the same rules as those of private persons"). reaction, began to request the extension of sovereign immunity as a matter of course.! The Court's attitude towards the executive branch on the subject of foreign sovereign immunity changed substantially over the first half of the twentieth century, and eventually resulted in a shift away from
The Pesaro. In Republic of Mexico v Hoffman, 39 the Court, citing the potential embarrassment of conflict between the executive and judiciary, held that "it is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which our government has not seen fit to recognize."' The Court noted that this principle was not followed in The Pesaro and attempted to distinguish that case on factual grounds." However, the two cases were closely analogous, as noted by Justice Frankfurter. 2 In fact, the decision in Hoffman was heavily criticized. 3 After Hoffman removed the judiciary from the process, all that remained for the United States to join a growing list of nations" and fully adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was a statement of policy from the Executive. Functions?, 40 Am J Intl L 168,168-69 (1946) . Some have suggested that the shift from a common law of foreign sovereign immunity flowing from the law of nations to a policy of deference to the executive is a reaction to the Erie limitation on federal common law. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 Mich L Rev 2129 , 2163 (1999 . The Tate Letter, however, has posed a number of difficulties. From a legal standpoint, if the [State] Department applies the restrictive principle in a given case, it is in the awkward position of a political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts. Moreover, it does not have the machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review.
50
See id ("The foreign state also decides when it will attempt to exert diplomatic influences, thereby making it more difficult for the State Department to apply the Tate Letter criteria."). The State Department also occasionally bowed to pressure from foreign sovereigns to allow immunity even when the act in question was "indisputably commercial." Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments at 8 (cited in note 18). See, for example, Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba SA v MV Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F2d 619,623 (4th Cir 1964) (suggesting that the justification for immunity in these cases may lie in the executive's "intimate knowledge of matters affecting foreign affairs which are not public information"); Cardozo, 67 Harv L Rev at 613-14 (cited in note 43) (noting the need to defer to the executive branch on political questions).
51 28 USC § § 1602 et seq.
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The FSIA reaffirms the presumption of sovereign immunity 3 and delineates several exceptions to that presumption. These include commercial activity," state sponsored terrorism," arbitration, 56 and waiver, 7 among others. There is no express provision regarding the retroactivity of the FSIA.
A. Retroactivity Analysis before Landgraf
Before the Court's ruling in Landgraf, courts generally held that the FSIA was not to be given retroactive treatment. 9 While some courts appeared to apply the FSIA to "events" occurring before 1952, further inquiry reveals these to be peculiar scenarios involving post-1952 operative facts.6 Two main arguments were advanced by courts arguing against retroactive application to pre-1952 events. First, courts looked at the language of the statute and identified words indicating prospectivity. This analysis, however, ignores an important point-the 53 28 USC § § 1602,1604. 54 The exception still requires some nexus with the United States. 28 USC § 1605(a)(2) ("in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside of the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States").
55 28 USC § 1605(a)(7).
56
28 USC § 1605(a)(6). 57 28 USC § 1605(a)(1). 58 See, for example, Jackson, 794 F2d at 1497 (agreeing with the district court's conclusion that the "Act itself contained no statement indicating that restrictive immunity was intended to apply to transactions that predated 1952"). Congress, in enacting the FSIA, clearly did not intend to deprive plaintiffs of a U.S. forum for suits arising from facts between 1952 and 1976. Second, the courts determined that a pre-1952 retroactive application of the FSIA would prejudice antecedent rights. This second argument is discussed in detail in Part III.C.
The FSIA contains no express provision governing its retroactivity. There are, however, several noteworthy elements of the plain language of the statute indicating prospectivity. First, the Act directs that "[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States... in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter."'" Second, the statute indicates in its jurisdictional section that the district courts "shall have" jurisdiction over the cases specified in the FSIA. In addition to focusing on these two elements of the plain language of the FSIA that seem to indicate prospectivity, .
courts have noted that Congress gave the FSIA an effective date ninety days after its passage. "Such a postponement of a statute's effective date is evidence of the legislature's desire that it be given pro- the two statutes would be redundant; Congress, therefore, eliminated that portion of the diversity statute. 6 ' This raises a significant problem, however. As Judge Douglas Ginsburg has argued," by removing foreign sovereign defendants from the diversity jurisdiction statute, a prospective FSIA would have the effect of preventing suits arising from events prior to 1976 from being heard in U.S. courts. This would create a "blank period" from 1952 to 1976 when the U.S. had already adopted, but not codified, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. "Unless one is to infer that the Congress intentionally but silently denied a federal forum for all suits against a foreign sovereign arising under federal law that were filed after enactment of the FSIA but based upon pre-FSIA facts, the implication is strong that all questions of foreign sovereign immunity, including those that involve an act of a foreign government taken before 1976, are to be decided under the FSIA. ' Judge Ginsburg's position is supported by the legislative history. The history clearly shows that Congress intended the FSIA to be a codification of the principles of the Tate Letter, which embodied the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity, "followed by the courts and by the executive branch ever since [1952] ."" This argument is convincing, however, only inasmuch as it concludes that retroactivity is appropriate back to 1952 and no further. Neither Judge Ginsburg nor any court has found evidence of congressional intent for pre-1952 application of the FSIA. This is unsurprising, given Congress's impression that it was codifying a policy that began in 1952." In the absence of such intent, for pre-1952 retroactive application we are thrust into the analytical framework of Landgraf. 73 In the absence of clear intention, the retroactivity principles announced in Landgraf operate. These include the presumption against retroactivity and exceptions to this presumption for certain types of statutes.
B. Landgraf v USI Film Products
The Court reaffirmed and clarified this position in Lindh v Murphy. Rejecting an argument that the Landgraf framework was reached immediately upon a court's conclusion that the statute had no express provision governing retroactivity, the Court held that "in determining whether a statute's terms would produce a retroactive effect, however, and in determining a statute's temporal reach generally, our normal rules of construction apply." 9 These rules include, of course, the use of congressional intent to determine the temporal reach of the statute.
Without qualification, the term "retroactive" could have near limitless application. The Court in Landgraf stated that the determination of whether a statute operates "'retroactively' is not always a simple or mechanical task." 8 "A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law. '' n Finally, noting that the presumption against retroactivity can, when the statute is ambiguous, find itself in tension with the recognicommon law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect.").
75 Landgraf, 511 US at 265 ("Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted."), citing General Motors Corp v Romein, 503 US 181,191 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.") (emphasis added). It is exactly the retroactive application of the FSIA that will "upset settled transactions" based upon the reasonable belief that contracts made against the background of absolute sovereign immunity include bargained elements reflecting that fact. See Part III.D. tion that a court should "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,"' 3 the Court proceeded to deliver this pronouncement on the retroactivity of jurisdictional statutes, which finds itself at the center of the confusion over the retroactivity of the FSIA:
We have regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed. 607-608 & n.6 (1978) , we held that, because a statute passed while the case was pending on appeal had eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-question cases, the fact that respondent had failed to allege $10,000 in controversy at the commencement of the action was "now of no moment." Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually "takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case." Present law normally governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes "speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties."'"
In order to understand the application of Landgraf to the FSIA, further dissection of this passage is necessary. Here, it is unnecessary to explore those cases, such as Bruner v United States, 5 where the Court dismissed an action after a jurisdictional statute had been repealed, because they are not analogous to the FSIA retroactivity cases." The issue of FSIA retroactivity deals with cases not yet before the court, not the effect of a change in a jurisdictional statute on pending cases.
The Court cited Andrus v Charlestone Stone Products Co' for the proposition that jurisdiction may still exist where the statute enabling jurisdiction has been passed after the commencement of the action.,8
83
Id at 273, quoting Bradley v School Board of Richmond, 416 US 696,711 (1974) .
84 Landgraf, 511 US at 274 (citations omitted). 85 343 US 112 (1952) . 86 Id at 115-17 (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a case that was pending at the time Congress repealed the Tucker Act). The same is true for the other cases the Court cites for this type of "retroactive application. " See Hallowell v Commons, 239 US 506,508-09 (1916) (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine heirs to property held in trust at the time the statute was repealed); Assessors v Osbornes, 76 US (9 Wall) 567,573-75 (1870) (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear dispute over tax assessment when statute conferring jurisdiction was repealed 98 See Haven, 68 F Supp 2d at 945-46 (citing Creighton Ltd and Princz in applying FSIA retroactively). In Haven, the plaintiffs sued for wrongful seizure and expropriation of property seized during and after World War II and for interference with insurance contracts related to this None of this general discussion reaches the special case of a jurisdictional statute that gives a forum to a cause of action where none existed before. As I have noted, none of the cases cited by the Court address this scenario, and Creighton Ltd deals with a mere change of forum for the appeal of an arbitration award.9 It is this critical gap in lower courts' reliance on the Landgraf discussion of jurisdictional statutes that I criticize in Part III.B.
III. THE CASE AGAINST RETROACTIVITY
Landgraf indicates that courts should presume jurisdictional statutes to be retroactive."" It does not, however, indicate when courts should find exceptions to this retroactivity presumption. The Court cites Hallowell-which gives a two-pronged explanation arguing that jurisdictional retroactivity "simply changes the tribunal" and "takes away no substantive right"-to indicate when jurisdictional statutes can be permissibly retroactive.''
The FSIA fits neither of these criteria. First, and most impor- Finally, the FSIA should not be permitted to operate retroactively because it will, in effect, alter the terms of the bargained-for contract between the defendant nation and the plaintiff. Typically these cases involve bond issues, and the interest rate associated with the issue most certainly would have taken into account the inability of the noteholder to sue on the notes in U.S. courts.'08To change the legal rules ex post gives the plaintiff the benefit of his bargain twice. In this Part, I argue that the FSIA should not be applied retroactively to pre-1952 events.
A. The FSIA Is Not a Mere Jurisdictional Statute, but Substantive Law
Article III of the Constitution grants to the federal courts jurisdiction over cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made.".... Exactly what claims "arise under" in this fashion has long been the subject of dispute. ' The "arising under" prong of Article III jurisdiction would not be necessary in analyzing claims under the FSIA were those claims exclusively between U.S. citizens and foreign sovereigns. Federal courts can be granted jurisdiction over those claims by virtue of the diversity clause of Article III, Section 2, which provides jurisdiction for controversies "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects. ' " 5 The FSIA, however, uses broad language that can be read to include suits by foreign citizens or corporations against foreign sovereigns.1
6 If the federal courts are to obtain jurisdiction over these cases, an Article III justification, other than diversity, must be found. The Court held that the "arising under" requirement was satisfied by the FSIA in Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria." 7 In Verlinden, a contractual dispute arose between a Dutch corporation and the Central Bank of Nigeria. The trial court held that the FSIA applied to suits between foreign corporations and foreign sovereigns, " ' but dismissed the claim for failure to satisfy any of the statutory exceptions of the FSIA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the FSIA did not meet Article III's "arising under"
cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction.").
112 American Well Works Co v Layne & Bowler Co, 241 US 257,260 (1916) . 113 In Gully v First National Bank in Meridian, 299 US 109 (1936) , Justice Cardozo stated:
If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.
Id at 118. 114 For a general discussion, see Sandra Slack Glover, Comment, Article III and the Westfall Act. Identifying "Federal Ingredients," 64 U Chi L Rev 925 (1997) (describing Article III and proposing an alternative functional test: If a statute governs federal and state courts then it arises under.). The FSIA would also satisfy this test, as it provides the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in state and federal court. The FSIA accomplishes this through its removal provision, allowing any proceeding against a foreign sovereign to be removed to federal court. 28 USC § 1441(d) (1994 1981) . The Court agreed that this was the natural reading of the statue, which embraces "any nonjury civil action" against a foreign state provided the foreign state is not rendered immune by operation of the FSIA. Verlinden, 461 US at 489-91. See also 28 USC § 1330(a).
requirement." The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Article III's "arising under" requirement had been met and making two important conclusions about the FSIA in the process.
First, the Court concluded that "a suit against a foreign state under this Act necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence clearly 'arises under' federal law, as that term is used in Art. III. ' ' 2 . The Court concluded that since Congress has authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, it necessarily could decide under what conditions foreign sovereigns could be sued in federal court. 2 ' At the same time, exercise of this power must be regarded as substantive, in part because it "raise[s] sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States, and the primacy of federal concerns is evident.' '22 The Court, without qualification,' concluded that "every action against a foreign sovereign necessarily involves application of a body of substantive federal law, within the meaning of Art. III.. '' 24 Second, the Court rejected an argument, advanced by the Court of Appeals, ' that because statutes merely granting jurisdiction to the federal courts without satisfying the "arising under" requirement were unconstitutional, ' it followed that "a jurisdictional statute can never constitute the federal law under which the action arises, for Art. III purposes.'. 2 The Court reasoned that, since Congress had acted under its power to regulate foreign commerce, "the jurisdictional provisions of the Act are simply one part of this comprehensive scheme."' While many courts, including the D.C. Circuit in Creighton Ltd,' have treated the substantive and jurisdictional elements of the FSIA together, they can also be treated separately." Under this analysis, the 123 The Court did not limit its discussion to cases between foreign plaintiffs and foreign sovereign defendants and focused solely on the defendant in determining that the FSIA was more than a mere jurisdictional statute--substantive rather than procedural. Id.
124 Id at 497. Contrast this approach with the qualified language used in Landgraf, stating that jurisdictional statutes are generally to be applied retroactively.
125 Verlinden, 647 F2d at 328-29 n 24. 126 Such statutes, if constitutional, would allow Congress to completely bypass the "arise under" requirement by simply enacting jurisdictional statutes. See Glover, Comment, 64 U Chi L Rev at 935 (cited in note 114) ("The limits on the exercise of federal judicial power protect the states from federal usurpation of all judicial power."). By concluding that the FSIA should be applied retroactively, the D.C. Circuit and one other court have relied on Landgrafinappropriately, treating the FSIA as just another jurisdictional statute. Since the FSIA is substantive, not merely procedural, it cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule of Landgraf. Courts finding that the FSIA applies to pre-1952 events have ignored the combined dictates of both Verlinden and Landgraf. The former declares that foreign sovereign immunity is by nature substantive and the latter counsels that jurisdictional statutes are usually applied retroactively because they abridge no "substantive right" and speak only "to the power of the court." Courts should apply the canon of statutory construction holding that statutes should be construed so as to avoid rendering them unconstitutional. 3 ' The FSIA should be regarded by courts, as it was in Verlinden, as affecting substantive rights-those of sovereign immunity-and therefore as incapable of retroactive application under the general rule of Landgraf.
One objection to this analysis of the FSIA would be that it proves too much, mandating that the FSIA never be applied retroactively before January 1977 (the effective date of the FSIA As the FSIA applies to numerous commercial agreements between foreign sovereigns and plaintiffs in the United States, it is difficult to generalize about the facts surrounding those commercial agreements. Recent cases have, like Jackson, dealt with bond issues, and this example serves as a useful paradigm to discuss the effect of FSIA pre-1952 retroactivity. Background evidence suggests the parties bargained for many of these agreements under the assumption that the sovereign's domestic courts would not enforce the contract." ' Markets supplemented this "enforcement" by regulating the continued ability of the sovereign in question to borrow at low interest rates-when a country repudiates its debt, investors will be all the more wary about the next bond issue."' Using Jackson as an example,'° we see that the People's Republic of China did not subscribe to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as of 1988.' When the agreement at issue in that case was NY 1978) (applying the FSIA retroactively to events occuring just before its effective date of January 21, 1977 and noting State Department approval of this application, as well as the fact that "the Act does not purport to create new rights of immunity.
137 Landgraf, 511 US at 274, quoting Hallowell, 239 US at 508. See also Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments at 349-51 (cited in note 18) (comparing the FSIA to long-arm jurisdictional statutes and noting that the Jackson court did not consider this analogy). Dellapenna ignores the fact that the FSIA in Jackson created a forum for the case rather than merely shifting the forum from Chinese domestic courts to U.S. courts.
138 See, for example, Jackson v People's Republic of China, 596 F Supp 386, 389 (N D Ala 1984) (discussing the parties' expectations when the bonds were issued).
139 This will happen because repudiation increases the expected value probability of future repudiation, thereby increasing default risk. See Brealey and Meyers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 689-700 (cited in note 19) (discussing the relationship between default risk and interest rates).
140 Defendants may also have not simply defaulted, but repudiated previous debt. See, for example, Carl Marks, 665 F Supp at 340-46 (discussing effect of U.S.S.R.'s repudiation of debt that predates the Communist revolution). These changes in government leave creditors with a right without a remedy, "but this [would put] them in the same position any creditor was in, with respect to a sovereign, before the Tate Letter." Id at 346. That is, creditors of a foreign sovereign before the Tate Letter had to expect that at any moment, the foreign sovereign might repudiate its debt and claim sovereign immunity in its own courts. Investors, it will be argued, assume the risk of such an event, and should incorporate such a risk when calculating interest rates. See Part III.D. 141 The Jackson court noted:
At the time of the issuance of the bonds in 1911 up until the date of their maturity in 1951, China relied on the well-founded expectation that the then extant, almost universal doc-made, there was no forum in which its breach could be sued upon, as the government of China at that time had not consented to any waiver of its sovereign immunity' 2 and the United States was still uniformly applying the doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity.' 3 Given this, the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by the United States in 1952 created a forum where suits for breach of these contracts could now be heard. The FSIA, as a codification of that restrictive immunity policy, should not be applied retroactively under the reasoning of Landgraf when the effect of that application is considered against this background understanding. This argument would not have the same vitality in a case where the foreign sovereign had expressly waived its sovereign immunity in its domestic courts and there had been no change of government and repudiation of debt. In this scenario, the FSIA would merely operate to change the forum from the courts of the foreign sovereign to those of the United States. This would still leave the other obstacles to retroactive application.'" C. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Is an Antecedent Right Abridged by the FSIA In Landgraf, the Supreme Court was careful to characterize the retroactive application of jurisdictional statutes as abridging no antecedent rights. ' As we have seen, despite indications from the executive branch and lower courts about the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, as late as 1926 the Court held that absolute sovereign immunity was the law in U.S. courts.' In doing so, the Court relied on trine of absolute sovereign immunity governed all interactions between her and the United States and the citizens of the two respective countries. Concomitantly, China had no apprehension of being haled into a court in the United States to answer for any default of the bond issue. Similarly, the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff bondholders class had no expectation of any right to bring an action in a court of the United States upon a default of the bond issue. The Schooner Exchange ' and the fact that while this was not a matter of constitutional command, absolute sovereign immunity flowed from customary international law. " As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world.' ' . 9 Neither Chief Justice Marshall, nor the Court in The Pesaro apparently regarded foreign sovereign immunity as merely procedural.' 8 Contemporary courts view sovereign immunity as a matter of "grace and comity.""' Some may rely on the Court's characterization of foreign sovereign immunity as a matter of grace and comity to argue that sovereign immunity could not be considered an antecedent right. However, courts, nations, and investors all regarded absolute sovereign immunity as an antecedent right, grounded in judicial precedent, at least until the 1940s."' Only after courts began deferring to the President (and later Congress) did sovereign immunity cease to be a matter of judicial precedent and become a matter of discretion. More importantly, only after 1952 did the United States espouse the restrictive theory as the standard.1" The words "grace and comity" should not become incantations that sweep aside the previously settled law of foreign sovereign immunity.1 4 This interpretation also finds support from elsewhere in Landgraf itself, because sovereign immunity affects primary conduct. The Court, noting that procedural changes can be applied retroactively, relied on Investors in United States Treasury bonds can be reasonably assured that the United States government is extremely unlikely to repudiate those obligations. As a result, the United States can enjoy low interest rates on its Treasury notes. '6 In contrast, countries likely to undergo political or economic instability cannot avail themselves of such rock solid certainty and stability, and hence the interest rates on their bonds are significantly higher.' Today, however, investors benefit significantly from the FSIA in that if a foreign issuer defaults on its obligation, it is no longer immune from suit in the courts of the United States. Even in the case of a complete bankruptcy or debt repudiation, the foreign sovereign will likely have assets in the United States that can be attached.' 5 This fact alone serves to drive down interest rates on bonds issued by risky foreign sovereigns. ' 163 See id at 156 (comparing yields on U.S. Treasury notes and other government bonds and showing that average annual return on U.S. Treasury notes has been significantly lower than returns from government bonds, corporate bonds, common stocks, and small-firm common stocks from . 164 See, for example, Investors' Interest in February Treasury Bills Wanes, Polish News Bulletin (Mar 2,2000) (available on Lexis News; allnews file) (discussing higher interest rates in Polish Treasury bills due to macroeconomic and political instability but continuing demand from foreign investors due to their comparably high interest rates); Russian Domestic Bond Prices Climb After Rate Cut, Interfax News Agency (Mar 21, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 WL 17230451) (discussing lowering of refinancing rate to 33 percent, an order of magnitude greater than U.S. Treasury note interest rates). One of the contributions of portfolio theory is that unsystematic risks can be diversified away by investors, and therefore there should be no risk premiums for such unsystematic risk. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J Fin 77 (1952) (analyzing relationships between investors' beliefs about expected returns and portfolio choices). However, while this diversification alters the discount rate at which such investments' present values are calculated, it does not affect the expected return of the cash flows, which will be strongly impacted by a substantial risk of default, thereby increasing the interest rate that investors demand. 165 For instance, after the Soviet Union repudiated its debt, U.S. citizens claimed liens on Russian property in the United States. Carl Marks, 665 F Supp at 327. These liens were eventually transferred to a claims fund established by the U.S. government. Id. 166 Evidence of this should not be difficult to adduce from foreign bond prices and interest rates across 1951-52 (year of adoption of the Tate Letter), but would require a statistical analysis that is beyond the scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, elementary risk calculus would suggest that the greater certainty of a U.S. court remedy for foreign contract breaches would lower risk, which would in turn, in an efficient market, lower interest rates. See Brealey and Meyers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 195-203 (cited in note 19) (discussing the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the relationship between risk and return in efficient markets).
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